Pascal’s unclassified papers, perhaps due to the ease and freedom with which they can be rearranged, tend to focus on more particular issues. There is however an undeniable difference between the classified papers and those unclassified, or yet to be classified by Pascal himself. They have a dual concern: how to understand the world and how to exist within that world. I would suggest that although Pascal approaches both of these notions from a Christian perspective, he seems less concerned with the truth of Christianity and more with its application. The project of the later unclassified papers share this project with Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, even though Wittgenstein makes effort to approach from a more neutral position focusing on the universality of language and not an overarching truth.

I would like to use this blog post to look at where these two projects appear, at least to me, most similarly and when Emily Dickinson also turns her attention to this notion of how to be in the world. The three thinkers share an approach through individual will, control, and a connection between speaking, action, and intent.

Wittgenstein begins an investigation into the nature of willing, how it differs from wishing, and how much control or power one can have over it. In remark 618, he seems to disagree with Augustine’s idea “My will does not obey me” posing instead the idea that the body and the will can be divided, and in disagreement, but only through physical capability “I will, but my body does not obey me.” There is no possibility for Wittgenstein of a failure to will or an attempt to will. It is a certainty. What is not certain, and consequently what fascinates Wittgenstein and Pascal, is the uncertainty with which our will and actions are interpreted, how they function in the world.“Doing itself seems not to have any experimental volume” from the doer, yet it is impossible to know what the reaction will be (remark 620).

I am reminded of a quote of Hannah Arendt from her discussion of the Vita Activa in which she claims that it is only through speaking and action that man can exist in the world. Yet, outside of the initial motivation —or will as it would be so named in Wittgenstein— there is always an element of uncertainty. “This is the simple fact that, though we don’t know what we are doing when we are acting, we have no possibility ever to undo what we have done. Action processes are not only unpredictable, they are also irreversible, there is no author or maker who can undo, destroy, what he has done if he does not like it or when the consequences prove to be disastrous.” Arendt uses her conclusion to urge individuals to consider the cause behind their actions, as Wittgenstein does with his investigation into the nature of will, and to stress the importance of know what effect one’s actions can have on another. It is here that Wittgenstein differs from Arendt. “We can often predict a man’s actions from his expression of a decision” (remark 632) suggests that Wittgenstein is using his discussion of will, action, and intent to look at how we can read these in another person. It is through an understanding of the nuances and limitations of language that Wittgenstein believes understanding of one another can be achieved, and a knowledge of the nature of our own will and the actions it causes will allow us to articulate it fully and understanding the meaning of others’ articulations.

Pascal, similarly, points to the importance of understanding the nuances of language. In remark 784, for example, he notes “different arrangements of words make different meanings, and different arrangements of meanings produce different effects.” Pascal, in his traditional style, does not expand on this aphorism leaving it for his reader to unpack. However, in light of the later discussion he has, about voluntary and involuntary acts, it is likely that he is either warning readers of being careful of their words and the effect they may have or encouraging the same readers to notice word patterns— or language games— in others. Pascal’s discussion of voluntary and involuntary actions is, for the most part, posed in order to stress the importance of one’s actions and the motivation behind them. He belittles involuntary actions by comparing sneezing, something small and insignificant, with the prestige of being master of one’s actions. “It is because it is not pain that tempts and attracts us; it is we ourselves who voluntarily choose it and allow it to get the better of us, so that we are masters of the occasion, and in this it is man giving in to himself” (remark 795). It is, then, the feeling that becoming master of occasion gives to us that tempts us. Later, in remark 815, Pascal warns against the dangers of not thinking, or the dangers of this possibility: “Ordinary people have the ability not to think about things they do not want to think about.”  Implying that it is precisely the blind chasing of this feeling of mastery which we must be on guard against.

Dickinson, as a poet known for her peculiar punctuation, is constantly playing with the meaning and syntax of words for particular effect. However, at times she directly addresses the possibility words and their use have. Poem 913 is an example of when Dickinson looks directly at these issues and, in many ways, her investigation is in a similar vein to Wittgenstein’s and Pascal’s. The poem opens on the everyday occurrence of a man saying something “a quiet thing” without giving it too much thought. Dickinson immediately magnifies the possible effect of the words “that may furnish the Fuse unto a Spark”. The last line of the first stanza is of particular interest as it carries with it the same uncertainty in Wittgenstein’s notion of action: “In dormant nature-lain.” The fuse was there, but inactive, there is no way of knowing how it would or if it would be of effect. The second stanza follows in a similar vein. The emphasis is on the plural us, the need for care, and the importance of discourse. One must speak careful of what effect one’s words can have, be mindful in listening to what others say and how, and favour discourse over powder, charcoal, and fire.